Background to series CHE Discussion Papers (DPs) began publication in 1983 as a means of making current research material more widely available to health economists and other potential users. So as to speed up the dissemination process, papers were originally published by CHE and distributed by post to a worldwide readership.
The CHE Research Paper series takes over that function and provides access to current research output via web-based publication, although hard copy will continue to be available (but subject to charge).
Introduction
Any health system that aims to make the best use of its scarce resources will be concerned about variations in costs between different providers of the same health care. If providers can reduce costs to the level of best practice, resources might be released to provide benefits elsewhere. But in analysing variations in provision, it is important to ensure that an assessment of best practice includes not just costs but also patient outcomes. High costs are not always simply due to inefficiency and may be associated with better outcomes. Low costs may sometimes be a symptom of low quality care leading to poor outcomes.
Comparative cost analysis in a multiple regression framework can help to address the question of 'which variation in cost is justifiable' (Keeler, 1990) . By benchmarking providers against each other on the basis of their observed costs, a regulator can gain insights into the cost structure and identify the resource implications of heterogeneity (Shleifer, 1985) . Over the past three decades, several hundred studies have conducted comparative analyses of hospital costs (Hollingsworth, 2008) . While these have contributed to a better understanding of provider heterogeneity with respect to patient case-mix and production constraints, they have not convincingly addressed the issue of variations in quality and, particularly, health outcome as a potential explanation for observed costs (Newhouse, 1994 , Jacobs et al., 2006 . As a consequence, high quality hospitals may be incorrectly deemed inefficient and vice versa.
Since April 2009, all providers of publicly-funded care in the English National Health Service (NHS) are required to collect patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) for four elective procedures: unilateral hip and knee replacements, varicose vein surgery, and groin hernia repairs (Department of Health, 2008a) . Standardised questionnaires, including both generic (the EQ-5D) and conditionspecific instruments, are collected from all eligible inpatients before and 3 or 6 months after surgery.
Building on this initiative, this paper has two aims. First, we wish to explore to what extent variation in health outcomes are associated with observed cost variation in the provision of care that remains after controlling for case-mix and production constraints. Second, we investigate whether the new information on health outcomes changes our judgement of provider cost performance. We perform sensitivity analysis to assess the degree to which our findings depend on the choice of PROM instrument.
Our empirical approach is to estimate multilevel models that recognise the clustering of patients within providers. We use these repeated observations of the hospital's production process to distinguish random noise from systematic cost variation attributable to effort for which the provider can be made accountable. This approach differs from those typically employed in hospital efficiency studies in that it does not require us to specify a production possibility frontier; a task that has been frequently criticised in the past for its distributional assumptions and its sensitivity to modelling choices (Newhouse, 1994 , Skinner, 1994 . Furthermore, by focussing on single production lines with homogeneous products (e.g. hip replacement surgery) our analysis is less likely to violate the underlying assumption of a common production function across providers (Harper et al., 2001) . Our patient-level data also allow us to control for case-mix more thoroughly than otherwise possible in classical single-level regression models.
Conceptual framework
Social systems are often sufficiently complex to require a less-informed principal to delegate a task to a specialised agent in return for some reward 1 . The principal's objective is to ensure the publiclyfunded services are of adequate quality and delivered in a technically efficient manner. The potential agency problems arising in such situations are well known (Lafonte and Tirole, 1993) and occur when principal and agent have different objectives or value them differently and the agent's effort is unobserved. These information asymmetries allow agents to misreport effort and pursue their own objectives.
One way of mitigating the problem of misreporting is to improve the information base by undertaking comparative cost analysis. The problem is that when agents are heterogeneous with respect to their products and production processes, simple comparison does not suffice. Indeed, one would thus expect that "variation in cost is the norm rather than the exception" (Jacobs and Dawson, 2003, p. 204) . Any conclusions drawn from a naïve benchmark that does not account for such exogenous factors and product characteristics would therefore be biased and the principal risks misjudging relative performance.
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the agents' efforts, Shleifer (1985, p. 324) proposes multiple regression of costs on legitimate "characteristics that make firms differ, and correct […] for this heterogeneity". The natural framework for such regression analysis is the industry cost function that underlies all agents' production processes. In line with the literature on hospital costs (e.g. , we can specify the hospital cost function as
where Y is a vector of outputs, q is a measure of quality of care provided, r and w are price vectors for capital and labour, Z is a vector of environmental factors that constrain the production process and e is the level of effort exerted.
One potential source of variation in production costs is provider heterogeneity with respect to range and mix of outputs. Hospitals do not produce one homogeneous good or service. Even within patient groups receiving the same health care intervention, certain patients will require more attention and resources than others because they suffer from more severe conditions or differ with respect to other factors that determine treatment costs, e.g. age, gender or number and type of comorbidities. As a consequence, overall output of a hospital is better described as a mixture of different outputs, each of which is defined by the underlying severity of the patients. Unless patients are randomly allocated to hospitals, some providers may attract a more favourable case-mix than others and achieve similar costs while exerting less effort. It is therefore crucial to correct for output heterogeneity in order to allow for fair comparison.
A second reason why production costs may differ across hospitals is because some providers face a more adverse production environment than others. For example, hospitals may differ in their access to factor markets and they may pay different prices for capital and labour inputs. Some of this variation in input prices is arguably not within the provider's control but determined by location or the existing infrastructure.
Production costs may also differ across hospitals because of variations in quality of care. Hospitals may be able to reduce the rate of hospital acquired infections by devising efficient quarantine strategies or improve the outcome of surgery by employing experienced surgeons. Assuming that such quality initiatives are costly and their results are not readily observed by the regulator, providers may have incentives to reduce quality below some standard and misreport the cost savings as resulting from high effort (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998) . Conversely, hospitals may claim that higher costs are the result of better quality, not low effort. As long as the regulator cannot prove the first or verify the latter, any cost performance assessment will be inherently incomplete.
So far, the ability of comparative cost studies to account for quality variation has been limited by its multi-dimensional nature and the inherent difficulties of measurement. Ideally, one would like to measure the effect of hospital treatment on each patient's outcome, i.e. the change in health status induced by health care. Existing measures of output quality focus on the negative extreme of the outcome spectrum (e.g. mortality, re-admission, adverse events) but fail to account for improvements in health. In contrast, PROMs allow measuring variation across the entire spectrum and can be used to determine the production costs of health improvement.
Econometric approach

Estimating provider cost functions
Most comparative cost analyses are based on hospital-level cost functions. The limitations of this approach are long established (Newhouse, 1994) . In this study, we follow the recent literature on patient-level cost functions that recognise the inherent clustering of patients in hospital production lines (e.g. Dormont and Milcent, 2004 , Olsen and Street, 2008 , Laudicella et al., 2010 . The rationale for this approach is simple: observed hospital output is the sum of all patient treatment. Each patient has specific medical needs that require the provider to alter their production process and tailor care to the individual (Harris, 1977 , Bradford et al., 2001 . At the same time, production constraints and provider decisions with respect to the general setup impact to varying degrees on all patients. Examples include the cost of cleaning services or the price of labour. This implies that the cost of each patient reflects both the individual contribution of case severity and the contribution of general cost driving factors. By specifying the cost function at the level of the patient, we can incorporate both specific and general effects in our analysis and control more comprehensively for patient and provider heterogeneity.
We estimate multilevel models with provider-specific intercepts for each of the four PROM conditions (Rice and Jones, 1997, Snijders and Bosker, 1999) . Patients form the micro (i.e. level 1) observations and hospitals constitute macro (level 2) units. We identify the systematic cost variation at macro level that cannot be explained by case-mix, production constraints and the quality of care provided and interpret this unobserved provider heterogeneity as variation in effort.
We specify our empirical model as follows:
where is the cost of care 2 for patient in hospital . The vector contains case-mix controls that vary at micro level and is a vector of production constraints at macro level. The average initial health status 3 of the provider's patient population is given by the scalar , whereas average health gain is denoted as . denotes the common intercept term. Unexplained variation is decomposed into two components: i) a random error term that varies at micro level and is assumed to be distributed as ( ) and ii) a provider effect that captures unobserved heterogeneity at macro level. The provider effects can be interpreted directly, representing the amount of cost deviation from the population average. Accordingly, if < 0 the provider has lower average costs than would be expected given the characteristics of its patients and the constraints it faces, and vice versa.
In order to assess the sensitivity of provider rankings and estimates of effort to the addition of PROM information, we estimate an alternative model where health outcome information is excluded, i.e. is restricted to be zero. We compare estimates of obtained from the 'full' and 'restricted' models to identify providers for which a naïve benchmark without quality controls provides misleading assessments of cost performance.
Modelling unobserved heterogeneity
The econometric literature emphasises two classes of models that can be applied in the case of unobserved cluster heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002) . Fixed effect (FE) models are most common in panel data econometrics and treat the provider effect as parameters to be estimated from the data. Random effects (RE) models make the additional assumptions that all are identically distributed random variables and are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
Fixed effect estimators (e.g. within or LSDV) provide consistent estimates of the parameters independently of the true underlying model. The price for this consistency is that FE estimators only utilise within-cluster information. In contrast, random effects estimators exploit both within-and between-cluster variation and are therefore generally more efficient. However, they are biased when the assumed exogeneity of explanatory variables conditional on the unobserved effect does not hold.
When confronted with clustered data, economists tend to favour the less restrictive fixed effects approach over random effects. Interest is usually confined to the unbiased estimation of and unobserved heterogeneity is seen as a nuisance rather than of interest in itself. However, for the proposed comparative cost analysis, we believe that a random effects approach is preferable for three pragmatic reasons.
Firstly, both FE and RE models produce estimates of that are virtually identical. On statistical grounds, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for the hip and knee replacement models. However, we find that coefficients differ in the magnitude of £1 -£2; a difference that is statistically but not economically significant. We conclude that bias is a trivial concern.
Secondly, random effects estimators allow for direct modelling of macro level effects such as production constraints and quality of care. In a fixed effects approach, these effects cannot be included because they would be perfectly collinear with the indicator variables or washed out as part of the within transformation. Some studies have employed Estimated Dependent Variable (EDV) models to circumvent the problem (Lewis and Linzer, 2005, Laudicella et al., 2010) , where fixed effects are obtained from a first-stage regression and subsequently regressed on macro-level covariates. However, this additional regression step makes the results less readily interpretable, adds complexity and modelling uncertainty, is less efficient and requires analysts to "use (or even invent) ad hoc methods to correct their second-step regressions" (Beck, 2005, p. 458) . A random effects framework is better suited for the type of analysis that we propose and a common choice in multilevel studies 4 .
Thirdly, in the random effects approach, the provider effects are typically not directly estimated from the data but predicted from the underlying distribution of the random variables (Skrondal and RabeHesketh, 2009 ). This method is known as Empirical Bayes (EB) estimation and combines prior information about the parameter values with the information available from the data to obtain posterior means 5 . The resulting estimates of the provider effects (and their confidence intervals) are shrunken towards the mean of the prior distribution, where the amount of shrinkage is determined by the strength of information in the data. When information is sparse, i.e. the number of micro units within a macro unit is low, the posterior means resemble the mean of the prior more closely. Conversely, for macro units containing much information (i.e. large ), the results are primarily driven by the data and shrinkage is minimal. Fixed effects estimation does not allow for such shrinkage.
The advantages of Empirical Bayes estimation and shrunken provider effects have long been recognised in the literature on school effectiveness (Aitkin and Longford, 1986, Goldstein, 1997) and more recently in the performance assessment of health care providers (Bojke et al., 2011) . Shrinkage is a form of precision-weighting and is therefore a valuable mechanism to account for uncertainty in estimates for hospitals treating a small number of patients. Indeed, shrunken estimates are shown to have lower mean squared prediction error than non-shrunken estimates obtained from fixed effects estimation and are best linear unbiased predictors in linear models with random effects (Efron and Morris, 1973) . We believe that shrinkage is desirable in practical applications. It concentrates the discussion on those providers for which we can draw conclusions about their cost performance based on sufficient data but does not require us to set arbitrary inclusion cut-offs with regard to cluster size.
Data
Hospital Episode Statistics
Our study uses patient level data extracted from the Hospital Episode Statistics database (HES) for the financial year 2009/10. HES contains detailed information about care provided to all patients treated in NHS hospitals. The unit of observations in HES is the episode of care under the supervision of one consultant ("finished consultant episode" (FCE)). In order to obtain the full level of patient information documented across the inpatient stay, we link all associated FCEs and create provider spells (Castelli et al., 2008) . We select only those spells in which eligible PROM procedures have been performed (see NHS Information Centre (2010, pp. 22-28) for inclusion criteria). Further, we restrict our analysis to NHS providers due to the poor quality of data submitted by the independent sector (Mason et al., 2010) .
All patients are allocated to a Healthcare Resource Group (HRG v.4) . By design, HRGs are expected to explain a substantial amount of variation in observed costs. The grouping algorithm used by the NHS Information Centre (NHS IC) assigns HRGs to each FCE. We extract information on the HRG of the episode in which the (first) relevant PROM procedure has taken place and construct indicator variables for the ten most frequent HRGs. All other observations are grouped in the category 'Other HRG'. The most frequent HRG is set as base category in the regressions.
The construction of any classification system necessarily requires a trade-off between parsimony and homogeneity of the resulting groups. As a consequence, HRGs are unlikely to capture all variation across providers. Hence, we include a set of variables that are based on diagnostic codes (ICD-10) and procedure codes (OPCS-4.5). These include the main reason and type of surgery (PROMspecific), whether it was a primary or revision surgery, and the weighted Charlson index as a measure of co-morbidity (Charlson et al., 1987) . Further, we generate counts of non-duplicate, secondary diagnoses and procedure codes within a spell as further controls for co-morbidities and complications.
We account for patient demographics by sorting patients into age quintiles and create an indicator variable for male gender. To characterise the inpatient stay itself, we construct indicator variables for transfers in and out of hospital, whether the patient is discharged home or not, multi-episode spells and in-hospital mortality.
We construct variables that capture the influence of observed characteristics of the provider and production environment that are likely to constrain the production process. Larger providers may be able to realise economies of scale and we generate a measure of size based on the count of patients treated by the provider. To address economies of scope, we create an index of specialisation that reflects the dispersion of HRGs treated within the hospital (Daidone and D'Amico, 2009) . The index resembles a Gini index and is bound between zero (no specialisation) and one (all patients of hospital j fall into one HRG). Finally, hospital trusts are categorised into teaching and non-teaching facilities based on the classification system adopted by the National Patient Safety Agency (2009).
Reference cost
Hospital Episode Statistics do not include information on the cost of care. However, NHS trusts are required to provide information on their costs to the Department of Health for the annual compilation of the reference cost schedule and calculation of reimbursement prices. We utilise the 2009/10 return to construct patient-level cost data.
The reference cost report is implemented using a top-down costing methodology. Here, total hospital costs are progressively cascaded down through a hierarchy of costing levels, starting at treatment services, to specialities and finally to individual HRGs. Costs at HRG-level are reported separately for departments and are further disaggregated according to admission type (day case, elective and emergency care) and length of stay, where HRG-specific trim points are used to differentiate between short, average and long inpatient spells. We map the reference cost to our sample according to the algorithm documented in Laudicella et al (2010) . In absence of an agreed methodology on how to aggregate cost from FCE to spell level (Daidone and Street, 2011) , we assign the cost of the FCE in which the (first) PROM procedure has taken place.
We adjust patient costs by the Market Forces Factor (MFF) specific to the provider. The MFF is an index of relative prices for buildings, land and labour that is used by the English Department of Health to adjust reimbursement for what is deemed unavoidable variation in input prices (Department of Health, 2008b) . By applying this index to the costs reported in the reference cost schedule, we can wash out justifiable variation in input prices directly.
Patient-reported outcomes
Data from the PROMs programme cover April 2009 -March 2010 and are published at hospital-level by the NHS IC for all providers of NHS-funded care. The data are obtained by surveying patients before and after their operation. For each hospital, data are available about the average health status pre-surgery, post-surgery, and the average change in health after treatment 6 .
The PROMs survey includes both generic and condition-specific instruments for which data are reported separately. Table 1 summarises the PROM instruments used for each procedure that are reported by the NHS IC. The EQ-5D is a generic PROM comprising a set of questions asking patients to indicate whether they have no, some or severe problems on five dimensions (mobility; self care; usual activities; pain/discomfort; anxiety/depression). These responses are used to describe a patient's EQ-5D health profile. That health profile is summarised using utility weights 7 obtained from members of the general public (Dolan 1997) , anchored at 1 (full health) to 0 (dead), with scores < 0 indicating states considered worse than being dead. The patient also provides their own assessment of their overall health state on a visual analogue scale -the EQ-VAS -from 0 to 100 (worst to best possible health, respectively).
The condition-specific Oxford Hip and Knee Scores consist of 12 questions, each of which requires responses on a 5-point severity scale. Equal importance is given to all questions and summary scores range from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). The Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire (AVVQ) contains 13 questions and scores between 0 and 100. In contrast to the aforementioned instruments, higher scores on the AVVQ indicate worse health states.
Results
Descriptive statistics
We present descriptive statistics in Table 2 .
Each of the four conditions is sufficiently populated to allow for precise estimation of case-mix effects at patient level. In contrast, the number of providers is comparably low (125 to 147 hospitals), reinforcing the value of multilevel analysis as compared to traditional hospital-level analysis. Furthermore, we observe large variations in cluster size within and across production lines. One would thus expect that provider effects are estimated with varying degrees of precision and that shrinkage can contribute to a more conservative assessment of hospitals' efforts.
The cost of care varies considerably across providers for each of the four procedures. For example, for knee replacement surgery we observe average costs of care by provider that range from below £2,000 to more than £10,000. High cost cases are not confined to one or two providers. Rather, we observe that many hospitals report costs for patients in excess of two standard deviations above the national average. This suggests that these cases are truly high-cost cases and not artefacts of the way local accounting system operate or how costs are assigned to patients. We therefore retain all observations in our sample and do not trim 'outliers' based on observed costs.
The generic nature of EQ-5D and EQ-VAS allows for comparison of health outcomes across conditions. Patients undergoing hip or knee replacement surgery experience substantially larger increases in health status than those receiving groin hernia or varicose vein surgery. This is consistent with the less serious nature of the underlying conditions. We observe disagreement between EQ-5D and EQ-VAS on the direction of health change for the latter groups of patients. Whether this is a result of aggregation or a genuine difference between instruments cannot be explored with our dataset. Table 3 presents regression results from a model with EQ-5D outcome information. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Regression results
Baseline estimates
We find significant coefficients on the majority of HRG variables (not reported). This indicates that the current reimbursement system is able to distinguish between different types of patients and their expected costs. Several other patient characteristics explain costs over and above the allocated HRG. For example, we observe an age effect and find that certain types of main diagnoses and procedures are significant predictors of treatment costs. Costs are higher for patients that undergo more procedures or suffer from a higher number of comorbidities as well as for patients that are transferred in or out of hospital or not discharged to their usual place of residence.
The results at provider-level are less clear cut. The average cost of patients treated in teaching hospitals is generally higher than in non-teaching hospitals but the effect is statistically significant only for groin hernia repair. We do not find conclusive evidence that NHS hospitals realise positive economies of scale or scope within production lines. This is somewhat surprising given the substantial differences in volume and, to a lesser degree, specialisation observed across providers for each of the four conditions.
With respect to PROM data, we find that the coefficient on initial health status shows the expected negative sign for three out of four conditions but is only statistically significant for the two orthopaedic procedures. Patients that present with higher health status at admission require fewer resources than patients in worse conditions; a result that seems intuitively correct. The relationship between health gain and costs is negative in all four models. This would indicate that some providers are able to secure greater health gains and provide care at lower cost than other providers. However, no results are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Sensitivity analysis -source of PROMs data
In order to test the stability of our findings, we scrutinise two modelling choices: First, we re-estimate the various models using EQ-VAS and condition-specific PROMs. While there are good reasons to prefer generic instruments over condition-specific instruments, for example because the former facilitates broader comparisons across disease areas, one should not a priori exclude the latter for this type of analysis. Second, we test for a parabolic relationship between health outcome and costs as previously reported in the literature (Hvenegaard et al., online first) . The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is used to compare the fit of the 'full' and 'restricted' model, where improvements in model fit are indicated by negative changes. Results of this sensitivity analysis are summarised in Table 4 .
We find a negative linear relationship between health gain and costs for knee replacement surgery when outcomes are measured via EQ-VAS. The statistical significance of this specific model is reemphasised by the improvement in AIC. However, we do not find support for this result with regard to the other two PROM instruments nor any of the other procedures.
In contrast, we find stronger evidence of a non-linear relationship between health gain and costs for hip replacement surgery using either Oxford Hip Score or utility-weighted EQ-5D. The estimated relationship is U-shaped with initially negative marginal effects that turn positive when average health gain passes a saddle point. This suggests that those providers located on the downwards sloping side of the curve could substantially improve health outcomes while reducing costs. In contrast, providers on the upward sloping side can only achieve better outcomes by investing more resources.
For varicose vein surgery, the estimated relationship is positive and exponential for the EQ-VAS and the Aberdeen Varicose Vein score, although the latter is only jointly statistically significant. One may interpret this as the right-hand side of the U-shaped relationship that we observe for hip replacement surgery.
Impact on provider effects
We now turn to the assessment of providers' efforts to contain cost. We illustrate our results with the example of hip replacement surgery and the Oxford Hip Score. Figure 1 shows the Empirical Bayes estimates of the provider effects and their corresponding confidence intervals as obtained from models with linear and squared OHS health outcome terms ('full model') and without health outcome information ('restricted model'). Hospitals to the left of the graph have lower average costs than hospitals to the right. Average national costs are normalised to zero.
We find substantial differences in provider effects after accounting for case-mix, production constraints and health outcomes. The 'best' hospital has risk-adjusted production costs that lie about £6,350 below the national average, whereas the 'most expensive' hospital deviates from the average in the opposite direction by a similar amount. However, these differences in costs, while substantial, do not seem to be driven by variation in health outcome. Comparing the estimates of the full and restricted model, we find that, for the vast majority of hospitals, the additional quality information does not result in different judgements with regard to their relative cost performance. Only four hospitals experience statistically significant changes in their estimated provider effects as indicated by nonoverlapping confidence intervals when comparing estimates from the two models. Unsurprisingly, these hospitals are at the top and bottom of the outcome spectrum and, hence, are influenced most from specification of the exponential relationship between costs and quality. Furthermore, two of these four hospitals are located on the downward sloping side of the cost-quality curve, i.e. produce poor outcomes at high costs. We believe that regulators or purchasers of care should not amend their judgement about these hospitals. By allowing for a non-linear relationship between cost and quality and controlling for the latter, one effectively 'explains away' systematically higher costs for these providers or, put more plainly, rewards them for bad performance. Hence, the change in provider effect is not driven by legitimate economic reasons, but merely a result of over-adjustment.
Results for the other models are reported in Appendix 1. Again, we do not find estimates of hospital cost performance to be greatly affected by the addition of health outcome information. 
Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to measure cost variation in the provision of four selected surgical procedures under special consideration of differences in the quality of care provided. Our work builds on a new policy initiative by the English Department of Health to collect patient-reported health outcomes using generic and condition-specific instruments. This study is a first attempt to incorporate health outcomes into comparative cost analysis and explore whether this new measure of quality changes judgements about the relative performance of NHS hospitals. We make a case for multilevel modelling with precision-weighting and highlight the advantages of this technique over other approaches to performance measurement.
Our results suggest that systematic cost differences exist across hospitals in the provision of surgical procedures that is not due to either patient or production process characteristics. Some of the variation in costs can be associated with the average health outcome and we find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between cost and outcomes for hip replacement and varicose vein surgery. For a handful of hospitals, such health outcome adjustment leads to a statistically significant improvement in their estimated cost performance. However, we have argued that the economic judgement should differ depending on whether the hospital is located on the positive or negative slope of the cost-quality curve and that one should be aware of the risk of over-adjustment.
Several implications for policy makers and future research arise from our results. First, the impact of health outcome information on provider rankings and estimates of cost containment effort is, at best, minimal. This casts doubt on claims that might be made by some hospitals that their higher production costs are a consequence of investing in better care that produces better health outcomes. That said, our analysis is restricted to outcome information averaged at provider level and it will be interesting to see whether this finding still holds for analyses that utilise patient level outcome data.
Second, our study has only explored the association between cost and health outcome, but cannot ascertain causality. Future work should aim to overcome this limitation and specifically account for the potential endogeneity.
Third, if the relationship between cost and quality is indeed non-linear, pay-for-performance and quality bonus programs have to acknowledge non-constant marginal costs and set different prices for different health outcomes. If the association between outcomes and cost is negative or non-existent (see e.g. groin hernia repair) then quality bonus payments of any form should be understood as incentive payments in excess of production costs. The way in which quality incentive schemes are designed might therefore be quite different for different conditions and depend on the observed association between costs and outcomes. In some cases, a purchaser or commissioner will need to reimburse the additional costs of production in order to allow providers to break even whereas in the other cases non-financial incentives may suffice.
Fourth, at this early stage of the PROM initiative and on the basis of our preliminary analysis, we cannot single out a preferred PROM instrument that should be applied exclusively in future analyses of hospital cost performance. We therefore recommend using both generic and condition-specific instruments and conducting sensitivity analysis with regard to the choice of PROM instrument as we have done here. 
